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OF THE CORONAVIRUS CRISIS
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ABSTRACT
Some participants of the public debate have argued that the world before and
after the coronavirus crisis will look fundamentally different. An underlying
assumption is that this crisis will alter public opinion in such a way that it
leads to profound societal and political change. Scholarship suggests that
while some policy preferences are quite volatile and prone to change under
the influence of crises, core values formed during childhood are likely to
remain stable. In this article, we test stability or change of a well-selected set
of opinions and values before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. We rely
on a unique longitudinal panel study whereby the Dutch fieldwork of the
European Values Study 2017 web survey serves as a baseline; respondents
were re-approached in May 2020. The findings indicate that values remain
largely stable. However, there is an increase in political support, confirming
the so-called rally effect. We conclude our manuscript with a response to the
futurists expecting changes in public opinion because of the coronavirus crisis.
KEYWORDS Coronavirus crisis; European Values Study; Kendall’s tau-b; panel data; public opinion;
values stability
1. Introduction
‘Never let a good crisis go to waste,’ Winston Churchill once said. The
coronavirus crisis, which affected all corners of the world, made influen-
tial thinkers contemplate about what the future might bring for European
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societies. To give but one example, at the beginning of the COVID-19
pandemic, futurist Yuval Noah Harari (2020) saw governments con-
fronted with two main dilemmas: one between totalitarian surveillance
and citizen empowerment, and another between nationalist isolation
and global solidarity. Because public policy requires broad public
support (Burnstein 2003), such political choices would require a clear
shift in public opinion in the direction of one of the two options. The
first dilemma, for instance, would require a preference change towards
either less focus on privacy or more focus on individual responsibility.
However, there is lack of evidence about whether the current pandemic
has the potential to change public opinion en masse. The aim of this con-
tribution is to verify empirically which opinions and values have shifted
amidst the coronavirus crisis.
Empirical research on public opinion in crisis times, including after
terrorist attacks (Dinesen and Jaeger 2013; Hetherington and Nelson
2003), natural disasters (Malhotra and Kuo 2006), and during economic
downturns (van Erkel and van der Meer 2016; Margalit 2013; Reeskens
and Vandecasteele 2017), confirm that the exposure to insecurity
causes a conservative reflex. It has been shown for instance that popu-
lations give more support to governments or display negative sentiments
towards outgroups. At the same time, such effects are often short-lived
(Dinesen and Jaeger 2013; Margalit 2013), suggesting that public
opinion moves back to its initial position when the source of the insecur-
ity has been removed. Yet, COVID-19 poses a novel challenge, where
immediate medical insecurity about the virus goes hand in hand with
financial insecurity posed by the economic fallout caused by social distan-
cing measures. The fact that the present crisis is a context unfamiliar to
European societies proposes a unique opportunity to study the stability
or change of public opinion, contributing to scholarly knowledge by sep-
arating values, attitudes and preferences.
In this contribution, we depart from seminal insights on the stability
and volatility of public opinion (Converse 1964; Inglehart 1977;
Uslaner 2002). These suggest that values socialized at a young age are
stable within individuals over time; by contrast, opinions are expected
to be more volatile as they are a reflection of current conditions. In
this contribution, we empirically verify which values and opinions
change and which remain stable amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.
For our test, we rely on unique data gathered as part of the most recent
Dutch data collection of the European Values Study (2020). The mixed
mode design of the 2017 survey allowed for re-approaching web survey
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participants (LISSPanel) inMay2020.By exploring concordant responsepat-
terns among individuals between 2017 and 2020, as well as within-individual
changes between these waves, we respond to questions about the extent to
which the present crisis has shaken up public opinion, or whether it has
remained invariant to current challenges posed by COVID-19.
2. Theory
Existing literature on the stability of public opinion distinguishes
between ‘core values’, and ‘mere preferences’, i.e. attitudes (Uslaner
2002: 57). Values are usually enduring, whereas preferences might
change over time, sometimes even from day to day. Values, broadly
understood as ‘concepts or beliefs about desirable end states or behaviors
that transcend specific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behav-
ior and events, and are ordered by relative importance’ (Schwartz &
Bilsky 1987: 551), are thought to be stable, because they largely result
from socialization processes at a young age (Inglehart 1977). Our
parents have taught us certain values that got anchored in our belief
systems, and also the circumstances which we grew up in influence the
attachment to certain values over others. Such values are at the core of
our belief system, and the more central a value is within this system,
the more stable it is over time (Converse 1964). This does not mean
that values never change, but they do so far less often than preferences,
which make them inherent to our identity (Uslaner 2002).
Scholarship often highlights the stability of religious values,1 as they are
imprinted during ones upbringing (Markides 1983). Also values that
relate to the core of a belief system tend to be very stable, as they form
the basis for one’s morality and have become part of the personal identity
(Converse 1964; Inglehart 1985; Uslaner 2002). After religious values, also
political affiliation tends to be stable (Carmines and Stimson 1980; Con-
verse 1964; Inglehart 1985; Uslaner 2002). Being more left- or right-
wing oriented is an identity individuals regularly express throughout
their lives, for example in political discussions or through voting. This
identity is also fundamental for other beliefs. Finally, in terms of core
values, Inglehart (1977; 1985) propagates that the extent to which an indi-
vidual holds more materialistic or post-materialistic values depends on
the socio-economic position during childhood socialization.
1An important disclaimer, here, is that most of this scholarship is US-based, where the religion and secu-
larization take a different position than in Europe (Casanova 2007).
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For opinions, we rely on the definitions of an attitude, which is defined
as ‘a disposition to respond favorably or unfavorably to an object, person,
institution or event’ (Ajzen, 2005: 3). Preferences that result from them,
are based on an assessment of the current state of affairs, rather than on
ingrained norms or ideals. They often entail cognitive evaluations of
current (political) actors, institutions, or policies (Converse 1964;
Uslaner 2002). Attitudes and preferences change quite easily when
people find themselves in a different condition, when they are provided
with convincing information, or when actors or institutions change
their policies (Uslaner 2002). A typical example of an unstable preference
is political trust (Mishler and Rose 2001). It largely depends on the per-
formance of incumbent politicians and current policies: when people feel
like the government is performing well, they are politically trusting and
vice versa, making political trust volatile.
Political preferences are, however, not homogenous. To distinguish
between political issues, Carmines and Stimson (1980: 78) distinguish
between ‘easy issues’ and ‘hard issues’, whereby the former originate
from long-standing principles socialized at an early age and are addressed
with ‘gut responses’, while the latter are more situational and require
sophisticated evaluation and contextual information. The distinction
between both is based on three criteria: ‘1) the easy issue would be sym-
bolic rather than technical, 2) it would more likely deal with policy ends
than means, 3) it would be an issue long on the political agenda’ (Car-
mines and Stimson 1980: 80). In our study, this distinction is of
utmost importance. Uslaner (2002), for instance, categorizes attitudes
on gender equality as volatile, because they were in flux in the 1970s.
However, based on Carmine and Stimson’s (1980) criteria, we would con-
sider attitudes towards gender equality as an ‘easy issue’ and hence more
stable: it is symbolic, it deals with policy ends, and it has been on the pol-
itical agenda for a long time (see also Inglehart and Norris 2016).
Figure 1 summarizes the ranking of discussed values, attitudes and
preferences along the continuum of stable versus volatile. In this list,
values socialized at a young age are proposed as most stable, whereas
hard issues that typically prompt evaluations in a specific context are
below the list presented as most volatile.
This brief review highlights that the influence of the current corona-
virus crisis might differ along the type of values, attitude or preference.
The stability or change of values and opinions is to some extent con-
ditional to external circumstances, proposing expectations about how
the current COVID-19 pandemic may affect the rank order. First of all,
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(temporal) economic drawbacks or physical insecurities could cause
short-term value change, even for values that are usually highly stable
due to childhood socialization, such as (post-)materialism (Inglehart
1985). Secondly, the way information is presented to the public strongly
influences the extent to which people perceive an issue as ‘easy’ or ‘hard’,
and thus the extent to which the underlying values are likely to change
(Carmine and Stimson 1980; Converse 1964). If non-pharmaceutical
interventions, including a nation-wide lockdown, are perceived as a
simple ‘freedom or no freedom’ or ‘healthy or ill’-issue – an easy issue
– people are less likely to (temporarily) change their values than when
the complexities of the issue, context, and interventions are presented,
which makes it a hard issue in the framework of Carmines and
Stimson (1980).2
In sum, for our study of the influence of present crisis on stability or
change of public opinion, we expect that highest stability is present
among the core values that are shaped during childhood socialization
and are known for being highly stable over the lifespan, including religi-
osity, political ideology, social trust, and post-material value orientations.
Most volatile will be preferences about ‘hard’ political issues, e.g. topics
like privacy, which have been politicized during the current pandemic
because of discussions over e.g. a coronavirus tracking smartphone appli-
cation, storing customer contact details in restaurants and contact
Figure 1. The Expected Stability of Values Before and During the Coronavirus Crisis.
Note: Ranking is based on Converse (1964, 46).
2See Carmines and Stimson (1980: 80–81) for a similar example regarding the Vietnam War.
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tracing. Also expressions of institutional trust are expected to be rather
volatile, as they depend upon government functioning and populations
might ‘rally’ around incumbent governments. For ‘easy’ policy prefer-
ences, for instance gender role attitudes or redistributive preferences,
the expectation is that they are more volatile than core values, but
more stable than hard issues.
3. Data and methods
3.1. Data
For this study, unique panel data was gathered for which ethical approval
was granted by the Ethical Review Board of the Tilburg School of Social
and Behavioral Sciences. As a baseline, we use the Dutch part of the Euro-
pean Values Study 2017 (EVS 2020). For its data collection, a mixed
mode strategy was applied, combining face-to-face CAPI data collection
with a CAWI web survey. We only consider the latter, as we have been
able to re-approach these respondents over time. From the LISS Panel
(CentERdata 2020), a probability-based household panel study, drawn
from population registers, consisting of approx. 5000 households and
approx. 7500 individuals, a sample of 2515 respondents was drawn. Field-
work3 took place between 1 September 2017 and 31 January 2018, realiz-
ing a sample of 2053 respondents (approx. 80 percent response rate). In
May 2020, the same respondents that participated in the initial data col-
lection and continued to be LISS panel members were re-approached
with a strongly reduced questionnaire to test stability and change of a
well-considered set of items. Due to panel attrition and survey nonre-
sponse, 1281 respondents remain, allowing for within-individual over-
time comparisons.4 Nonresponse analyses indicate that over the course
of time, we lost particularly women as well as the active part of the
3The fieldwork was cut in two phases (first phase between September 11 and October 31, 2017; second
phase between January 1 and 31, 2018) because the web survey of the EVS was administered in a
matrix design. This design implied that the EVS Master Questionnaire was split in a core and four
remaining blocks. Respondents of the first phase were asked to fill in the core module and two ran-
domly selected blocks. In the second phase, respondents were asked to complete the matrix as they
were asked to complete the two remaining blocks of items that they were not offered in the first phase;
1722 of the original 2053 did so. For more information, check https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/
methodology-data-documentation/survey-2017/methodology/
4To increase statistical power, 326 additional (that were not part of the 2017 questioning) respondents
have been surveyed. However, because of the specificity of stability or volatility of values, attitudes and
preferences, these respondents are not considered, here. For this round of data collection, the response
rate was 78 percent.
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population.5 Because of the idea that particularly younger cohorts are
prone to volatile responses, value and attitude stability might be overes-
timated. Post-stratification weights are applied to correct for the Dutch
population’s distribution with regard to sex, age, education, and region.
3.2. Measuring values, attitudes and preferences
We test the stability or change of all items collected in both 2017 and
2020. For precise question wordings, we refer to the EVS Master Ques-
tionnaire, which can be retrieved from GESIS (EVS 2020), or to online
Appendix 1, which clarifies the response categories as used for the
analysis in this contribution.6 Here, we present the items in the theor-
etically based rank order from most stable to most volatile.
Religiosity, in the questionnaire restricted to the item asking the fre-
quency of praying, is expected to be most stable. We also consider political
ideology, broadly defined and measured with the left-right self-placement
scale, as quite stable, as well as social trust, asked with the item whether
most people can be trusted or whether you cannot be too careful. We
further include post-materialism as a stable value, measured using the
Inglehart index, which asks about the two most important political aims
from this list of four, i.e. (a) ‘maintaining order in the nation’, (b)
‘giving people more say in important government decisions’, (c) ‘fighting
rising prices’, and (d) ‘protecting freedom of speech’, with (b) and (d) as
post-material aims, and (a) and (c) as material ones. Morality items
ought to be stable too. Here we include legal permissiveness, which is a
scale averaged over the items whether claiming state benefits even if one
is not entitled to it, and cheating on taxes if one has the chance is acceptable
behavior. Moral permissiveness, then, is about whether euthanasia, suicide,
and having casual sex are permissible. We also consider diffuse political
norms that flow from post-materialism as relatively stable, i.e. national
pride, as well as items about good ways of governing the country, in our
survey asked by whether it would be good or bad to have respectively a
strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections,
and experts making decisions according to what they think is best for the
country.
5Detailed analyses, which can be retrieved from the online Appendix 2, indicate that dropout in the
panel was most likely among the younger respondents (18–29 years old), while particularly those
aged 50–79 years retained in the panel. Also women were more likely to abstain from participating
in the 2020 panel.
6Additional information, such as syntax files, can be retrieved from the corresponding author.
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Less stable are so-called easy political issueswhich appeal to an emotional
‘gut’ response. Gender equality is measured by the item whether families
suffer when women work full-time. Further, we include prejudice towards
immigrants, as averaged over three items whether immigrants take away
jobs, make crime problems worse, and are a strain on the welfare system.
Furthermore, we examine EU scepticism using the item whether European
integration has gone too far.We also consider social solidarity, by creating a
scale of the extent to which respondents are concerned about the living con-
ditions of elderly people, the unemployed, immigrants, and the sick and dis-
abled. Related are two items measuring redistribution preferences, namely
whether incomes should be made more equal and the extent to which indi-
viduals or the state should takemore responsibility to ensure that everyone is
provided for.
More volatile, then, are the perceptions that trigger an evaluative
response. Here, we consider institutional trust, following the distinction
(e.g. Rothstein and Stolle 2008) between trust in representative insti-
tutions (a scale averaged over two items regarding confidence in respect-
ively government and parliament) and trust in societal institutions
(averaged over two items regarding confidence in respectively the edu-
cation system and the health care system). Satisfaction with the function-
ing of the political system is also covered. In addition, items about the
importance of work, family, friends and leisure are included.7
Most volatile are ‘hard’ political issues that require more elaborate
evaluation of social issues. One example might be a scale measuring con-
cerns over privacy infringes by the government, averaged over three
items if the government may keep people under video surveillance in
public areas, monitor all emails and any other information on the inter-
net, and collect information about their citizens without their knowledge.
3.3. Assessing stability and change
To assess stability or change in values, attitudes and preferences, we
perform two tests. First, we look at the Kendall’s tau-b coefficient,
which is based on the number of concordant and discordant responses
7Admittedly, these items are harder to categorize, since their nature is somewhat ambiguous. On the one
hand, they could be viewed as an evaluation of one’s current, context dependent capability to divide
time between family, friends, work and leisure, which would indicate an attitude. On the other hand,
they could refer to the extent to which respondents generally value these aspects in their life, which
would indicate a rather stable value. With some uncertainty, we therefore expect these issues to take a
place in the middle of the stability ranking.
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over time (Uslaner 2002: 59).8 This coefficient reads as a correlation
coefficient but is based on the ranks of the data, with higher values indi-
cating a higher similarity between 2017 and 2020, and thus more stability.
Second, we calculate individual difference scores by subtracting the
2017 score from the 2020 score. The implication is that a higher differ-
ence score indicates a stronger preference for the listed values or opinions
in 2020 than in 2017. We perform one-sample t-tests; the sign of the test-
value indicates whether on the whole, preferences for this item increased
or decreased; the significance of the test indicates whether this increase or
decrease differs from zero, hence, whether values changed or are stable.
4. Results
Table 1 presents the results of our analyses, distinguishing stability in the
rank order (column ‘tau-b’), and the direction of change (column ‘t-
value’), as well as whether the rank order in individual stability confirms
the theoretical expectations (column ‘confirm’), i.e. whether a high stab-
ility was expected (top position in the table) or low stability was expected
(bottom position in the table). For 18 of the 23 studied values, the rank
order in individual value stability is in line with theoretical assumptions.
Most stable is religiosity, expressed by praying, which is deeply
ingrained at a young age and relatively stable over the lifespan (Markides
1983). Apparently religiosity is unaffected by a crisis of the present mag-
nitude. The same holds for political ideology in terms of left-right self-
placement (see also Miller and Shanks 1996; Sears and Funk 1999):
there is a large overlap in respondents’ positioning in 2017 and 2020,
and no change in average values between the two waves. Confirming
Uslaner (2002), people do not readily change in social trust either.
However, at the aggregate, social trust increased between 2017 and
2020, implying that those who changed scores moved in the direction
of more social trust. In combination with solidarity, which remains
largely stable between the two waves, our findings suggest that while
people might not have become overwhelmingly more pro-social amidst
the crisis, at least no harsher stances were adopted.
The bottom of Table 1, where most volatility was found, shows some
patterns that follow the theoretical assumptions, and others that are more
surprising but might be understood given the particularities of the
current COVID-19 pandemic. According to the literature, we expected
8In case of social trust, which is dichotomous, the phi-coefficient is calculated (see Uslaner 2002: 59).
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that complex policy preferences, in particular, are susceptible to change
(Carmines and Stimson 1980). We indeed see that concern over
privacy infringes, theorized as a ‘hard issue’, is quite unstable and
increase over time, which might be a direct response to discussions
over contact tracing measures. On the other hand, the preference for
state intervention is volatile and decreased slightly although we expected
stability in this item. Similar is the reliance on expert involvement in
policy making and preference for strong leadership, which increased
since 2017. These latter findings can be understood given that state inter-
ventions and the role of expertise for policy decisions have been more
salient in the pandemic response to a new virus than usual. Finally, Ingle-
hart’s post-materialism index was also subject to volatility between 2017
and 2020. While the theory expects that these dispositions ought to be
stable, here, the corona crisis induced a politically antidemocratic ‘rally
effect’ (cf. Mueller 1973).
This brings us to a related unexpected finding. Based on the literature,
institutional trust is supposed to be quite volatile, as it reflects insti-
tutional performance. Here, we see that while more trust is given to
both representative and societal institutions amidst the corona crisis,
confirming the ‘rally effect’ (see also Bol et al. 2020), most respondents
Table 1. Values Stability and Change, 2017–2020.
Value N Range Tau-b T-value Confirm
Praying 1,189 1–7 0.798 −1.02 Yes
Left-right scale 1,045 1–10 0.684 1.68 Yes
Social trust8 1,225 0–1 0.623 2.88** Yes
Solidarity 1,199 1–5 0.573 0.88 Yes
Trust in Parliament and Government 1,213 1–4 0.562 12.23*** No
Gender equality 1,124 1–4 0.560 9.30*** Yes
EU skepticism 1,043 1–10 0.547 −0.49 Yes
Traditional moral permissiveness 1,194 1–10 0.523 −2.40** Yes
National pride 1,169 1–4 0.523 −0.11 Yes
Immigrant prejudice 1,141 1–10 0.523 −4.15*** Yes
Importance of work 1,238 1–4 0.519 −4.08*** Yes
Importance of friends 1,264 1–4 0.489 −1.29 Yes
Income equality 1,151 1–10 0.477 +4.86*** Yes
Trust in the education and health care systems 1,181 1–4 0.477 15.01*** Yes
Legal permissiveness 1,153 1–10 0.476 0.57 Yes
Importance of leisure 1,258 1–4 0.464 −2.24* Yes
Political satisfaction 1,157 1–10 0.457 9.98*** Yes
Importance of family 1,252 1–4 0.451 −1.47 Yes
Post-materialism 1,145 1–4 0.442 −7.29*** No
Privacy concerns 1,168 1–4 0.441 7.70*** Yes
Strong leader 976 1–4 0.410 2.75** No
State intervention 1,150 1–10 0.371 −2.13* No
Experts, not government 967 1–4 0.345 5.97*** No
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. Values are sorted by Kendall’s tau-b coefficient. See online Appendix 1
for question wording and response categories.
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actually did not change positions. However, all and all, apart from some
extraordinary but plausible positions, it doesn’t seem like the coronavirus
crisis has shaken up values tremendously.
5. Conclusion
For political and societal reform to take place, public opinion should
provide a clear window of opportunity by taking sides in particular
debates. The results of our analysis indicate, however, that this prospect
of change of values, attitudes and preferences amidst the corona crisis is
rather sobering. The rank order of the items studied in terms of their rela-
tive stability follows most seminal studies that investigated over-time
stability in the absence of a crisis as the world in general and European
societies in particular are currently facing (Converse 1964; Uslaner
2002). From that perspective, futurists who thought that the world
before and after COVID-19 would look vastly different have overlooked
how persistent values actually are in the face of exogenous shocks.
In terms of political opportunities, values undergirding democratic
governance are quite volatile amidst the coronavirus crisis. As Inglehart
(1985) already suggested, these normally deeply rooted values may tem-
porarily change in response to external threats. By comparison, insti-
tutional trust, which ought to be volatile as it is a reflection of
government functioning, shows quite some concordant responses,
although public opinion is more supportive of actors relevant for hand-
ling the COVID-19 pandemic. The interpretation is therefore a clear
‘rally effect’ (Mueller, 1973): more an emotional than a rational response
to institutional functioning (see also Bol et al., 2020).
This finding of a ‘rally effect’ does, however, not indicate that govern-
ments can implement any measure to contain the virus: people do, for
instance, show more concerns over privacy infringements by the govern-
ment. People seem to be extremely sceptical about how contact tracing
measures to fight the pandemic like coronavirus tracking apps affect
their personal realm. This shows that concerns over privacy are ‘hard’
political issues; it is a technical discussion on a relatively new issue
with practical policy means. This finding shows how multifaceted politi-
cal support amidst the corona crisis actually is, and how it requires
intense scrutiny in the near future.
Evidently, there are limitations in our study. Our findings confirm that
values and opinions for the most part react to this crisis as can be expected
according to public opinion research. Nevertheless, the most important
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liability is the selected case.With its self-proclaimed ‘intelligent lockdown’,
theDutch government addressedDutch culture,with an emphasis on indi-
vidual responsibility, potentially producing more institutional trust. In
addition, economic aid measures might have remedied immediate econ-
omic hardship, leaving some values unaffected. This begs the question
whether the present findings can be paralleled in other countries, or
whether they are unique for the Netherlands. Secondly, the present
study did not provide a detailed overview of which segments of the popu-
lation are more prone for change. Studies document that particularly the
young and the most vulnerable groups would report change (Inglehart
1997). Given the particular research question of the present article, we
aimed for breadth in terms of items rather than depth in terms of under-
standing the socio-demographics. Several changes over time (e.g. the
increase in social trust and decrease in prejudice towards immigrants)
requiremore scrutiny; future studies can provide amore segmented analy-
sis. An additional limitation is the limited timespan of the current study.
The stability and volatility discovered amidst this ‘intelligent lockdown’
might be temporary and not long-lasting, making that additional rounds
of data collection are necessary. Responding to the COVID-19 special
issue of present journal, our study presented the findings of a first round
of data collection. With a second wave to be fielded in October 2020, we
hope to give a more comprehensive overview of how public opinion has
shifted or remained stable over the course of the coronavirus crisis.
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MQ Question wording Response categories
Praying V64 How often do you pray outside
of religious services?
From 1 = never
to 7 = every day
Left-right scale V102 In political matters, people talk
of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. How
would you place your views on
this scale, generally speaking?
From 1 = the left
to 10 = the right
Social trust V31 Generally speaking, would you
say that most people can be
trusted or that you can’t be too
careful in dealing with people?
From 0 = can’t be too careful






To what extent do you feel
concerned about the living
conditions of the following
groups living in your country:
(V217) elderly people, (V218)
unemployed people, (V219)
immigrants, (V220) sick and
disabled people.
From 1 = not at all





Please tell me, for each item
listed, how much confidence
you have in them: (V121)
Parliament, (V131)
Government.
From 1 = none at all
to 4 = a great deal
Gender equality V74 Can you tell me how strongly
you agree or disagree with the
statement ‘all in all, family life
suffers when the woman has a
full-time job.’
From 1 = strongly agree
to 4 = strongly disagree
EU skepticism V198 Some say that the European
Union enlargement should go
further. Others say it has
already gone too far. Which
number best describes your
position?
From 1 = should go further






Please tell me for each of the
following whether you think it
can always be justified, never
be justified, or something in
between. (V156) euthanasia,
(V157) suicide, (V158) having
casual sex.
From 1 = never
to 10 = always
National pride V170 How proud are you to be a Dutch
citizen?
From 1 = not at all proud




Indicate where you would place
your views on this scale?
(V185) Immigrants take/do not
take away jobs from the Dutch.
(V186) Immigrants make/do
not make crime problems
worse
From 1 = do not take jobs away to
10 = do take jobs away
From 1 = do not make crime
problems worse to 10 = do make
crime problems worse
From 1 = are not a strain
to 10 = are a strain
(Continued )






MQ Question wording Response categories
(V187) Immigrants are/are not
a strain on a country’s welfare
system
Importance of work V1 How important is work in your
life?
From 1 = not at all important
to 4 = very important
Importance of friends V2 How important is family in your
life
From 1 = not at all important
to 4 = very important
Income equality V107 ‘Incomes should be made more
equal’ vs. ‘There should be
greater incentives for
individual effort’
From 1 = there should be greater
incentives for individual effort to








Please tell me, for each item
listed, how much confidence
you have in them.
(V117) The education system,
(V126) Health care system
From 1 = none at all
to 4 = a great deal
Legal permissiveness V149,
V150
Please tell me for each of the
following whether you think it
can always be justified, never
be justified, or something in
between. (V149) claiming state
benefits which you are not
entitled to, (V150) cheating on
tax if you have the chance.
From 1 = never
to 10 = always
Importance of leisure V4 How important is leisure time in
your family?
From 1 = not at all important
to 4 = very important
Political satisfaction V144 On a scale from 1 to 10 where ‘1’
is ‘not satisfied at all’ and ‘10’ is
‘completely satisfied’, how
satisfied are you with how the
political system is functioning
in your country these days?
From 1 = not at all satisfied
to 10 = completely satisfied
Importance of family V3 How important are friends and
acquaintances in your life?
From 1 = not at all important
to 4 = very important
Post-materialism V110,
V111
(V110) If you had to choose,
which one of the things on this
card would you say is most
important? (V111) And which
would be the next most
important?
(A) Maintaining order in the
nation, (B) Giving people more
say in important government
decisions, (C) Fighting rising
prices, (D) Protecting freedom
of speech.
1= Postmaterialism (= B&D)
2 = More postmaterialism (= B
first, A or C second, OR D first, A
or C second)
3 = More materialism (= A first, B
or D second, OR C first, B or D
second)




Do you think that the Dutch
government should or should
not have the right to do the
following?
(V205) Keep people under
video surveillance in public
areas.
(V206) Monitor all e-mails and
any other information
From 1 = Definitely should have
the right









MQ Question wording Response categories
exchanged on the Internet.
(V207) Collect information
about anyone living in the
Netherlands without their
knowledge
Strong leader V145 I’m going to describe various
types of political systems and
ask what you think about each
as a way of governing this
country. For each one, would
you say it is a very good, fairly
good, fairly bad or very bad
way of governing this country?
Having a strong leader who
does not have to bother with
parliament or elections.
From 1 = very bad
to 4 = very good
State intervention V103 ‘Individuals should take more
responsibility for providing for
themselves’ vs. ‘The state
should take more
responsibility to ensure that
everyone is provided for’
From 1 = individuals should take
more responsibility for providing
for themselves
to 10 = the state should take
more responsibility to ensure
that everyone is provided for
Experts, not
government
V146 I’m going to describe various
types of political systems and
ask what you think about each
as a way of governing this
country. For each one, would
you say it is a very good, fairly
good, fairly bad or very bad
way of governing this country?
Having experts, not
government, make decisions
according to what they think is
best for the country.
From 1 = very bad
to 4 = very good
A2. Nonresponse Analysis of Participation in the 2020 Corona
Questionnaire
Over the course of time, 772 respondents dropped out. While the 2017 data collec-
tion consisted of 2053 respondents, 1281 of these 2053 respondents participated in
the 2020 data collection (i.e. a dropout of 38 per cent). We cannot assume that
this nonresponse is random; certain stages in life and eventually also certain disposi-
tions make that some respondents are more likely to stay engaged in the LISS Panel,
while others increase the likelihood to drop out.
In this nonresponse analysis, we briefly review what basic sociodemographic
respondent characteristics explain dropout in the 2020 wave. To do so, we categorize
age in decades, i.e. respondents in 2017 being 18–29 years old (N = 259), 30–39 years
old (N = 301), 40–49 years old (N = 310), 50–59 years old (N = 329), 60–69 years old
(N = 434), 70–79 years old (N = 332), and respondents from 80–99 years old (N =
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88). We further distinguish between men (N = 912) and woman (N = 1141). Also
levels of education is included, which is ISCED-coded from 1 (primary education
or less) to 7 (Master’s degree or higher). Last but not least, we also include trust in
partisan institutions in 2017, measured by the average of trust in government and
trust in parliament.
Table A2. Explaining Nonresponse in the Second Wave.
Exp(B) SE
Intercept 0.735 0.341
Age (Reference: 80–99 years old in 2017)
. 18–29 years old
. 30–39 years old
. 40–49 years old
. 50–59 years old
. 60–69 years old
















Levels of education 0.963 0.027
Trust in partisan institutions 0.735 0.341
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Nagelkerke R2 = 0.098.
The results of the regression analysis shows that particularly the active population
and the oldest cohort was most likely to drop out. Compared with the oldest
cohort (80-99 years old; chosen because medical conditions hinder continuous par-
ticipation in the LISS Panel), the youngest cohorts is 71 percent more likely to drop
out, while there is no significant difference with the age groups of 30–49 years old. By
contrast, those 50–79 years old are less likely to drop out. In addition, woman are 30
percent more likely to drop out than men. While we could have expected that the
lower educated and those low on trust would be more likely to drop out, the analysis
does not support this finding, as significant effects are absent.
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